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Resumen En este artículo utilizamos datos de encuestas para comprender el electorado de Bolso-
naro y, al hacerlo, discutimos interpretaciones significativas sobre las condiciones del 
surgimiento de los políticos populistas. En la primera sección, presentamos y discuti-
mos interpretaciones macro que recurren a procesos de cultura política o socioeconó-
mica para explicar el populismo. En la segunda parte, describimos brevemente la carre-
ra política de Jair Bolsonaro y mostramos por qué es un miembro auténtico de la familia 
populista. En las secciones tercera y cuarta, presentamos datos de encuestas sobre los 
votantes de Bolsonaro, sus características socioeconómicas y sus creencias con respecto 
a los regímenes políticos y las instituciones democráticas, y las cuestiones morales en 
conflicto. Argumentamos que los datos muestran que las bases sociales del presidente 
no son las que la literatura actual relaciona con los líderes populistas y que sus actitudes 
hacia la política y las cuestiones morales no difieren significativamente de las que se 
encuentran entre los partidarios de otros candidatos que se postulan para la presidencia 
en 2018. conclusiones, sugerimos algunas explicaciones alternativas al inesperado éxito 
electoral de Bolsonaro.
Palabras clave Electorado de Bolsonaro, Cultura Política Brasileña, Populismo.
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Abstract In this paper we use surveyed data to understand Bolsonaro’s electorate and, in doing 
so, we discuss significant interpretations about the conditions to the rise of populist 
politicians. In the first section, we present and discuss macro interpretations that resort 
either to socioeconomic or political culture processes in order to explain populism. In 
the second part, we describe, briefly, Jair Bolsonaro’s political career and show why he is 
an authentic member of the populist family. In the third and fourth sections, we present 
survey data on Bolsonaro’s voters, their socioeconomic features, and their beliefs regar-
ding political regimes and democratic institutions, and contending moral issues. We 
argue that data show that the president social bases are not those the current literature 
relates to populist leaders and that their attitudes towards politics and moral issues do 
not differ significantly from those found among supporters of other candidates run-
ning for the presidency in 2018. In the conclusions, we suggest some alternative expla-
nations to Bolsonaro’s unexpected electoral success.
Keywords Bolsonaro Electorate, Brazilian Political Culture, Populism.
Introducción In October 2018, a majority, of the Brazilian voters have chosen Jair Messias Bolsonaro, 
an extreme-right populist politician, president of Brazil. The election was the culmi-
nation of five years of political turmoil. It began with massive street demonstrations, 
in 2013, followed by a polarized presidential election in the next year, the disclosure of 
corruption scandals that brought down the elected president allowing for the rise of a 
discredited and unpopular vice-president, in 2016, amid a deep economic crisis com-
promising the government fiscal capacity. The crisis has buried a long-lasting political 
arrangement, dating from the mid-1990s, and organized around centripetal electoral 
competition between center-left and center-right party coalitions.
Besides bringing to power an extreme-right Messiah, the elections brought several 
new-comers to govern the states and produced extreme party fragmentation in Congress. 
Current 
explanations for 
the rise of populism
The concept of populism has a long story in the political studies, dating from the late 
XIX Century. Throughout this period, its meaning has changed following the different 
phenomena it was supposed to capture. Populist was the Jacksonian ordinary people’s 
democracy. Populists were the radical intellectuals searching for the real soul of Mother 
Russia among poor peasants. Populists came to be labeled the Latin American moderni-
zing leaders that promoted state-led industrialization and the political inclusion of the 
popular masses -such as the Mexican Lazaro Cárdenas, the Brazilian Getúlio Vargas and 
the Argentinian Juan Domingo Perón-. Last but not least, populist were called the eco-
nomic policies that did not conform to the hegemonic liberal orthodoxy and were fis-
cally permissive, besides allowing for redistributive policies thought to have nefarious 
inflationary consequences (Dornbush & Edwards,1991).
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More recently, the term populism has referred to the rise of leaders and movements, either 
from the left or from the right, that seem to be challenging the customary workings of 
contemporary liberal democracies.
Different as they may be according to their political origins, trajectories, or organized 
support, neo-populists differ from other democratic politicians by their anti-establish-
ment, anti-pluralism, anti-elite rhetorics. Challenging the status quo, they present them-
selves as the unique and authentic representatives of the people whose genuine aspi-
rations and traditional values they claim to exclusively embody. The claim to exclusive 
representation is not an empirical one; it is always distinctly moral (Müller, 2017: 47). Since the 
people are understood as a unique and unified social body, its recognition entails the 
existence of those who do not belong to it, the anti-people: the elites and the foreigners 
of any kind (Muller, 2017, Mounk, 2018, Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017, Filchenstein, 2019).
The rise of contemporary populism would be related to political polarization and the 
shrinking and the weakening of the political center in different societies, either by the 
radicalization of existing political parties or by the emergence or strengthening of ex-
tremist parties and movements (Abramowitz, 2010, Donahue & Heck, 2019, Mann & 
Ornstein, 2018, Ginsburg & Huq, 2018, Levistky & Zimblatt, 2018). According to Moffit 
(2016), populism is a political style whose global incidence was made possible by chan-
ges in the technologies of communication and by the increase and scope of information 
networks.
Political scientists and pundits agree that are tense the relations between populism and 
the democratic regime and see the rise of populist leaders as the sign of democracy’s dis-
content, if not of crisis. However some argue that populism contributes to balance repre-
sentative institutions’ inherently elitism and class-biased (Laclau, 2005, Mouffe, 2019).
Although the definition of populism and its relationship to polarization is consensual 
among scholars and analysts, there is a substantial discussion regarding what favors 
the ascent of populist leaders and movements around the world.
Risking oversimplification, we can, for analytical purposes, classify current explana-
tions into three groups that sometimes overlap. 
The first, see populism expressing the anger and fears of ordinary citizens displaced 
by the economic changes brought about by globalization and the rapid technological 
change entailed by it (Rodrik, 2018). Support for populism would come typically from the 
characters similar to those of the praised documentary American Factory: white American 
blue-collar workers whose jobs have disappeared with the reallocation of firms or tech-
nological innovations. Or from their European equivalents whose jobs are coveted -and 
supposedly “stolen”- by non-European immigrants. Or even, from large sectors of the mi-
ddle classes from the developed Western World whose income, according to Milanovic 
(2010) have decreased or stagnated as the result of globalization, while the conspicuous 
concentration of income and wealth grew remarkably. Another version of this argument 
emphasizes the unequal and powerful impacts of the 2008 global crisis (Judis, 2016) 
The central idea in those different versions of the same script is one of the people fee-
ling displaced by sudden economic shifts and forgotten by the political establishment 
(Hochschild, 2016, Donahue & Heck, 2019, Judis, 2017). Economic insecurity, fear re-
garding the future, rage against callous economic and political elites have been a recu-
rrent explanation of Trump’s surprising electoral success in 2016 among scholars and 
pundits (Vance, 2018).
The second set of explanations dwells into cultural cleavages focusing on values, beliefs, 
and on attitudes regarding race/ ethnic groups, religion or traditional moral values. 
Con servative reactions towards secularization, internationalization, multiculturalism 
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and gender politics would supposedly threaten the lifestyles of traditional national 
communities, elusive as they may be (Norris & Inglehart, 2019, Lilla, 2017, Siles, Tesler & 
Vevreck, 2017, Major, Blodorn & Major Blascovich, 2016, Green & McElwee, 2019).
The third set emphasizes the representation gap that seems to be part and parcel of 
the institutionalized democratic politics (Frank, 2016). According to those views, liberal 
technocracy’s extensive powers and increased distance between parties and/or profes-
sional politicians and their constituencies would open space for populist leaders spea-
king straight to the hearts of ordinary voters. In this sense, Müller (2018: 101) correctly 
remarks that populism is the permanent shadow of representative politics. 
In this paper, we acknowledge the importance of previous political polarization in Bra-
zil, dating from at least 2013, to favor the ascent to the presidency of a backbencher that 
did not have either the ear or the respect of his fellows at the Congress or significant 
political support from voters. 
On the other hand, we aim at contributing to the discussion about populism based on 
the case of Brazil. We will use survey data to assess the weight of socioeconomic featu-
res, political attitudes, religion, and moral values on electoral preference for Jair Bolso-
naro among Brazilian voters. We will also try to describe in those terms the core group 
of his most faithful supporters. 
We argue that explanations linking the rise of extreme right populist politicians to ma-
cro processes such as globalization effects on jobs and income, downward mobility, cul-
tural backlash or representative democracy crisis seem not to fit the survey data we have 
from Brazil. They show that Bolsonaro voters were far from being economic losers and 
that their political opinions and values are not that different from political opinions 
and values of those that have chosen other candidates. Therefore, we tend to support 
explanations pointing to contingent factors related to voter’s decisions under political 
and economic crises. Before that, we argue why populist is a suitable label to describe 
Jair Bolsonaro’s political style.
An accidental 
populist president
In August 2018, Bolsonaro had the preference of 23% of the Brazilians, according to elec-
toral polls, and very few people thought he could go much further. Against all the odds, 
two months later, he was the 38th elected President of Brazil, receiving 55,13% of the valid 
ballots against 44,87% of his opponent. 
His was not a career leading to the presidency. Jair Messias Bolsonaro graduated, in 
1977, from the Military Academy and served the Army in the artillery and paratroops 
units where he came to be known as an unruly officer. In 1986, he was arrested and 
detained for 15 days, after publishing an article at a weekly magazine criticizing the 
officers´ low salaries. One year later, he was accused of planning to plant bombs in mi-
litary units to protest once more against the military salaries. After been convicted by 
a military court he has been acquitted by the Brazilian Supreme Military Court in 1988 
and sent to retirement with the rank of captain (Maklouf, 2019).
In the same year, he was elected to the Rio de Janeiro City Council and two years later as 
one of the state’s representatives to the National House, to where he has been re-elected 
six times. 
Throughout his 27 years career in Congress, he has been an obscure backbencher who 
never presided any of the House committees and had only one law proposal approved. At 
the House, he came to be known as a bizarre outspoken politician that championed for 
the military interests, praised the 1964 military coup, the ensuing authoritarian regime, 
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and advocated torture against the democratic opposition. He also stood up for a deeply 
conservative agenda, opposing same-sex marriage and gay rights, abortion, affirmative 
action, drug liberalization, and arms control.
During his political career, Bolsonaro changed parties six times and became the presi-
dential candidate of a small party, the PSL (Social Liberal Party), that in 2018 had only 
two representatives at the Congress.
In Rio de Janeiro, he and three of his sons that have followed his steps in politics are 
known for their close connections to private militia groups that exert control over signi-
ficant portions of the poorest neighborhoods.
Friend to well-known evangelical protestant leaders, he has been married to his third 
wife by a minister of the largest neopentecostal denomination in Brazil -Assembleia de 
Deus- in 2013, and took baptism vows from another pastor, at the Jordan river, during a 
visit to Israel, in 2016.
A few months before, he had announced his decision to run for president, arousing con-
tempt and disbelief. Eventually, he joined the PSL and launched his presidential cam-
paign in 2018, having a right-wing retired military in his slate as vice-president and 
counting on the support of other few but prominent retired generals.
Bolsonaro presented himself not only as of the alternative to the leftist Workers Party 
(Partido dos Trabalhadores) but also to the “corrupt” political elite that had plunged Bra-
zil into an economic and moral crisis. Since long a professional politician, he introduced 
himself as an outsider running against the elites, the political establishment, and the 
“rotten” party system. His motto was vaguely nationalist and strongly religious: Brazil 
above everybody, God above everything. 
Family values and security issues were at the core of his political rhetoric. Nevertheless, 
he also championed liberal pro-market economic policies. He picked up an ultra-liberal 
economist operating in the financial markets, with a PhD degree from Chicago, as his 
advisor and promised future Minister of Economy.
Anyway, he did not have the opportunity to detail his proposals since he was stabbed, 
in September, while campaigning and therefore spared from participating in any pre-
sidential debates and network interviews. A blessing, taking into account his limited 
intellectual and rhetorical skills.
Bolsonaro’s TV propaganda was quite uncouth. However, he used social media very 
effectively to convey himself as an ordinary, simple man confronting the political elites, 
the leftist cosmopolitan intellectuals, and, above all, the PT “communists”. It worked. By 
now, we should ask who were the voters that gave him the presidency.
Core voters and 
electoral landslide
We have used electoral polls series from the institute Datafolha to better understand the 
profile of Bolsonaro’s voters. We have focused on the surveys done in June, just before 
the campaign started, and one day before election day in October. 
Table 1 shows the results of logistic regression of the voting intention for Bolsonaro in 
June 2018 and October 2018 on a series of sociodemographic and attitudinal variables. 
The regression coefficients allow us to examine the likelihood that different social pro-
files would declare their intention to cast a vote for him.
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Table 1. Results of logistic regression for prediction of voting intention in Bolsonaro 
in the begining of electoral campaign (june 2018) and one day before election day (first round, october 2018)
Voting intention in Bolsonaro
(07/06/2018) (03/102018)
(Intercept) -0.34 (-0.80, 0.11) 0.31*** (0.11, 0.50)
age 25 to 34 years old 0.13 (-0.17, 0.43) 0.21*** (0.06, 0.35)
age 35 to 44 years old -0.57*** (-0.90, -0.25) -0.01 (-0.16, 0.14)
age 45 to 59 years -0.87*** (-1.20, -0.53) -0.05 (-0.19, 0.10)
age 60 years or older -0.87*** (-1.24, -0.51) -0.0001 (-0.15, 0.15)
women -0.97*** (-1.18, -0.76) -0.57*** (-0.66, -0.49)
Income 2 to 3 minimum wages (m. w.) 0.36** (0.08, 0.64) 0.64*** (0.52, 0.76)
Income 3 to 5 m. w. 0.85*** (0.57, 1.13) 1.09*** (0.97, 1.21)
Income 5 to 10 m. w. 0.96*** (0.63, 1.29) 1.32*** (1.17, 1.46)
Income 10 to 20 m. w. 1.26*** (0.67, 1.85) 1.19*** (0.97, 1.41)
Income 20 to 50 m. w 1.67*** (0.44, 2.90) 2.09*** (1.64, 2.53)
Income more than 50 m. w. -11.36 (-593.71, 570.98) 1.98*** (1.12, 2.84)
Black -0.31*** (-0.54, -0.08) -0.32*** (-0.41, -0.22)
Yellow 0.11 (-0.45, 0.67) 0.30** (0.05, 0.56)
Indigenous -0.35 (-1.06, 0.35) 0.07 (-0.25, 0.40)
Other -0.24 (-0.79, 0.30) -0.44* (-0.89, 0.01)
Evangelical Pentecostal 0.13 (-0.23, 0.48) -0.27*** (-0.42, -0.11)
Evangelical Neo Pentecostal 0.18 (-0.49, 0.85) -0.22 (-0.53, 0.09)
Other Evangelical 0.17 (-0.54, 0.88) -0.15 (-0.51, 0.21)
Umbanda, Candomblé 
or other Afro-Brazilian religions -1.59
*** (-2.75, -0.44) -1.56*** (-1.95, -1.17)
Kardecist spiritist, spiritualist -0.91*** (-1.58, -0.25) -0.76*** (-1.00, -0.52)
Catholic -0.43*** (-0.73, -0.13) -0.77*** (-0.89, -0.65)
Jewish 0.49 (-1.19, 2.18) -0.60 (-1.40, 0.20)
Other religion -0.24 (-1.10, 0.63) -0.84*** (-1.22, -0.46)
Has no religion / agnostic -0.40* (-0.84, 0.03) -0.91*** (-1.12, -0.71)
Atheist / doesn’t believe in God -0.74 (-1.83, 0.35) -2.17*** (-2.75, -1.59)
South 0.10 (-0.20, 0.39) 0.22*** (0.10, 0.35)
Northeast -0.46*** (-0.75, -0.18) -0.66*** (-0.78, -0.55)
Midwest 0.40** (0.03, 0.77) 0.04 (-0.13, 0.20)
North 0.25 (-0.12, 0.63) 0.22*** (0.06, 0.39)
Democracy is the best 
form of government -0.35
*** (-0.56, -0.14) -0.63*** (-0.72, -0.53)
Observations 2,824 10,930
Log Likelihood -1,241.82 -6,412.63
Akaike Inf. Crit. 2,549.63 12,891.25
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Source: Datafolha
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In both moments, Bolsonaro’s core voter -who would be more likely to choose him- was 
a young man (25 to 34 years old), white, with high family income between 20 and 50 
minimum wages, evangelical and resident of the North, South and Midwest regions of 
Brazil. The likelihood that someone with this social profile declared his intention to vote 
for Bolsonaro was 89.5%, in June 2018, while the overall average was 19%. In October 
2018, the probability rose to 95%, v.g., almost every person of that group would vote for 
the PSL candidate.
The social type least likely to vote for Bolsonaro was a woman aged 45 to 59 years old, 
black, with a family income under two minimum wages, umbandista, self-employed, li-
ving in the Northeast Brazil. In June 2018, only 1,5% of people with this profile would 
vote for Bolsonaro. In October, the probability had risen to 10%, an impressive increase, 
but still well bellow the average voting intention at that moment (35%). It is needless to 
say that both groups represented a small part of the population and the electorate.
The six characteristics we have chosen in order to model the vote for Bolsonaro (sex, 
age, income, religion, region and color/race) allow 24.750 combinations. Some profiles 
are non-existent in the real world, and others are actually found. Therefore, although 
we can say which profile was more or less likely to declare his/her intention to vote for 
Bolsonaro, we cannot say that he has won due to the support of any specific group. What 
the data show is that both contextual and demographic factors help explain Bolsona-
ro’s victory. On one hand, since a higher income is directly related to preference for 
the extreme-right candidate and the Northeast region support for him was lower, we 
can speculate that his bad electoral performance -and a greater support for Fernando 
Haddad -in that region were due to PT governments public policies aimed at poor cons-
tituencies. On the other hand, in demographic terms, the higher propensity of blacks 
and women to reject the right-wing candidate points out to the strength of the identity 
agenda in these elections.
Core voters made Bolsonaro a competitive candidate but were not sufficient to secure 
victory. It eventually arrived as a result of the electoral competition, as voters increasin-
gly came to prefer him to other center-to-the-right candidates.
We have examined nine waves of polls, carried out by Datafolha before the first round, 
to see how different segments of voters changed their propensity to choose Bolsonaro. 
We have compared the coefficients of the same regression model applied to the nine 
waves. These coefficients correspond to categorical variables. Therefore, we will see how 
the categories of a particular variable behave in relation to a reference category. 
Using the coefficients of the complete model we can calculate the evolution of the pre-
dicted probability of different voter profiles to choose Bolsonaro. Figure 1 shows the 
evolution of the probability of Catholic voters with an income below two minimum 
wages according to sex, color, and region. In all the charts, we can see a jump starting 
in September (after the beginning of the TV campaign and the stabbing episode) and 
another jump in the second ballot. The assassination attempt brought greater visibility 
to the PSL candidate, which may explain the first leap. In the second ballot, the jump can 
be explained by antipetism (Samuels and Zucco, 2018).
Between the jumps, there are no significant changes, making the graphics take on the 
appearance of a staircase with three steps. This shape may indicate the absence of a 
contagion process. The idea of contagion, dear to several Brazilian analysts, denotes 
that Bolsonaro’s victory was due to the successful use of social networks allowing the 
support for Bolsonaro spread like a virus. When there is contagion, the increases are 
gradual and the graph shows a ramp shape. This is not what happened here.
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The graphs reaffirms the differences between the Southeast and Northeast regions, 
between men and women, blacks and whites. It is interesting to note that color/race, 
gender, and region interact to make the northeast the region where Bolsonaro got his 
lowest support rate. Among low-income voters, almost the majority of black men in the 
southeast and white men in the northeast supported the extreme-right candidate. Black 
or Northeastern women, on the other hand, always gave little support to him.
Figure 1. Evolution of predict probabilities of vote in Bolsonaro for low-income Catholic voters 
from a logistic regression model
Source: Logistic regression model runned in nine round of Datafolha surveys 
(07/06/2018 ,21/08/2018, 19/09/2018, 28/09/2018, 02/10/2018, 04/10/2018, 18/10/2018, 25/10/2018, 27/10/2018)
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Figure 2 shows the predicted probability of voting for Bolsonaro among neopentecostal 
evangelical voters with an income below two minimum wages, according to sex, color, 
and region. We see that being evangelical attenuates the effect of gender and region, 
except for black women from the Northeast. The ladder in Figure 2 is already starting 
to look more like a ramp, which could indicate contagion as we will see by analyzing the 
profile of those earning between 20 and 50 minimum wages.
Figure 2. Evolution of predict probabilities of vote in Bolsonaro for low-income New-Penthecostal voters 
Source: Logistic regression model runned in nine round of Datafolha surveys 
(07/06/2018 ,21/08/2018, 19/09/2018, 28/09/2018, 02/10/2018, 04/10/2018, 18/10/2018, 25/10/2018, 27/10/2018)
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Figure 3 shows what happens with neopentecostal evangelical voters with high income, 
between 20 and 50 minimum wages. Now the ramp shape is definite, indicating conta-
gion among the wealthiest, which can be probably explained, at least in part, by the use 
of social networks.
Figure 3. Evolution of predict probabilities of vote in Bolsonaro for high-income New-Penthecostal voters
Source: Logistic regression model runned in nine round of Datafolha surveys 
(07/06/2018 ,21/08/2018, 19/09/2018, 28/09/2018, 02/10/2018, 04/10/2018, 18/10/2018, 25/10/2018, 27/10/2018)
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Interestingly, the same contagion effect appears with Catholics, challenging the inter-
pretations that stress the importance of the evangelical church for Bolsonaro’s election, 
at least among the wealthier. Another interesting finding is the inflection of the candi-
date’s support curve in the second round, common to all groups analyzed here.
The data shows that an array of factors accounted for Bolsonaro’s election. Identity 
issues related to gender and race, retrospective voting, political factors interacted to 
convey the candidate’s support. The non-evangelical, the poor, and the lower middle 
class, black and northeastern women, were the bastion of resistance to Bolsonarism. 
High-income men and women supported him. The PT incapacity to gain the majority 
of poor whites in the northeast and poor blacks in the southeast, especially if they were 
evangelicals, may have meant the difference between victory and defeat.
In the end of the day, almost fifty-seven million eight hundred Brazilians voted for Bol-
sonaro in the second ballot giving him an advantage of 10.67 percentual points over the 
PT candidate.
How different were Bolsonaro voters’ opinions from those who have chosen Haddad or 
other candidates in the first round?
Brazilian voters’
political attitudes 
and moral values 
In order to answer that question, we have used data from LAPOP 2019 regarding diffe-
rent political and moral issues to compare attitudes of those who have declared voting 
for Bolsonaro and other candidates in the first election’s round. 
Table 2 shows that around 60% of respondents think that although democracy has pro-
blems, it is still the best form of government . 
There is no significant difference between the two groups of the electorate: 61% of Bol-
sonaro’s voters and 64% those that had other candidates value the democratic regime 
positively.
On the other hand, Brazilians, in general, are not very satisfied with the way democracy 
works in their country: around 70% say they are dissatisfied or very dissatisfied. Bolso-
naro’s voters show more satisfaction with democracy than others: 48% versus 36% (Table 
3). This result is not surprising: since their preferred candidate won the election, the 
system reflects their will. Finally, 44% of the extreme-right voters agree that those who 
govern the country show interest in what people like them think, against 29% of those 
who voted for the losers.
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Table 2. Proportion of respondents who believe that democracy is the best form of government 
among those who voted and did not vote for Bolsonaro
Democracy is the best form of government I feel that the Government hear me
Others Bolsonaro Others Bolsonaro
Disagree very much 0.08 0.07 0.26 0.18
Disagree 0.03 0.03 0.13 0.08
Disagree a little 0.08 0.09 0.16 0.14
Indiferent 0.18 0.19 0.14 0.17
Agree a little 0.22 0.19 0.14 0.18
Agree 0.14 0.16 0.08 0.12
Agree very much 0.28 0.26 0.09 0.14
Total 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Source: LAPOP 2019
Table 3. Proportion of respondents who are satisfied with democracy 
among those who voted and did not vote for Bolsonaro
Satisfaction with Democarcy
Others Bolsonaro
Very satisfied 0.07 0.08
Satisfied 0.29 0.40
Unsitisfied 0.48 0.43
Very unsitisfied 0.17 0.09
Total 1.00 1.00
Source: LAPOP 2019
Although more satisfied with democracy, 46% of those voting for Bolsonaro think that 
too much crime justifies a coup d’état. Among those who voted for other candidates, 
the percentage is 31%. The difference between bolsonaristas and non-bolsonaristas is 
greater when it comes to corruption. 47% of those who voted for Bolsonaro, against 25% 
of those who did not, believe that a coup d’état is justified in the face of too much corrup-
tion. This difference of more than 20% is the same when people are asked if, in difficult 
times, the Supreme Court should be closed, although the difference drops to 10% when 
it comes to shutting down the Congress (29% vs. 19%). Table 4 and 5 show these results.
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Table 4. Proportion of respondents who think a coup is justified in the case of _________ 
among those who voted and did not vote for Bolsonaro
Great Violence Much Corruption
Others Bolsonaro Others Bolsonaro
The military would be 
justified to take power 
by a coup d’etat.
0.31 0.46 0.25 0.47
The military wouldn’t be 
justified to take power 
by a coup d’etat.
0.69 0.54 0.75 0.53
Total 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Source: LAPOP 2019
Table 5 - Proportion of respondents who think it is justified to close _________ 
in very difficult situations, among those who voted and did not vote for Bolsonaro
Congress Supreme Court
Others Bolsonaro Others Bolsonaro
It is justified 0.19 0.29 0.27 0.47
It is not justified 0.81 0.71 0.73 0.53
Total 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Source: LAPOP 2019
It is worth emphasizing that the majority of both bolsonaristas and those who voted 
for other candidates, although dissatisfied with democracy, still think that it is the best 
form of government and mostly reject a coup or the closing of the STF or Congress.
In addition to being more satisfied with democracy, Bolsonaro’s voters, according to LA-
POP 2019, are also more satisfied with political institutions. The majority (51%) say they 
respect the country’s political institutions as opposed to 45% of those who preferred other 
candidates. Table 6 shows the distribution of respondents who, on a scale of 1 to 7, spell 
their degree of trust in some political institutions. We consider grades 5 to 7 on the scale 
as trust in institutions. Conversely, confidence degrees between 1 and 3 signal mistrust.
 While approximately two-thirds of respondents (63%) who voted for other candidates 
do not trust Congress, less than half of the Bolsonaristas (49%) have the same position. 
Although few respondents trust the political parties, confidence is greater among bolso-
naristas (15% against 8%). 
On the other hand, Bolsonaro’s voters also reveal greater confidence in security institu-
tions such as the Armed Forces (82% vs 58%) and the Military Police (62% vs 44%). 
These data indicate that, in general terms, Bolsonaro’s voters do not distinguish them-
selves for being particularly anti-democratic or averse to free political institutions, at 
least while his favorite candidate is in power. There is - and there has always been - a 
significant portion of Brazilians that do not praise the democratic regime or are indi-
fferent to it and a huger one that distrusts democratic institutions. Nevertheless, dissa-
tisfaction and distrust regarding them do not distinguish Bolsonaro’s electorate from 
those that casted their vote for other presidential candidates.
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Table 6 - Proportion of respondents who trust and don’t trust selected institutions 
among those who voted and did not vote for Bolsonaro. 
(Lines don’t add up to 100% since they don’t include indifferent)
Trust Don’t trust
National Congress
Others 0.23 0.63
Bolsonaro 0.34 0.49
Political Parties
Others 0.08 0.82
Bolsonaro 0.15 0.74
President
Others 0.30 0.59
Bolsonaro 0.76 0.13
Supreme Court
Others 0.33 0.50
Bolsonaro 0.54 0.30
Armed Forces
Others 0.58 0.29
Bolsonaro 0.82 0.11
Military Police   
Others 0.44 0.39
Bolsonaro 0.62 0.24
Source: LAPOP 2019
We had shown before that Jair Bolsonaro had a group of core voters, who upheld him 
before the election campaign began and whose endorsement was well above average. 
LAPOP 2019 results confirm that this core is formed mainly by white, young men, with 
upper-middle-income, neopentecostal, living in the South or Midwest regions. The ta-
ble with the results of logistic regression are in the Appendix 1.
Even among these most entrenched bolsonaristas there are no vast differences in opi-
nion and satisfaction with democracy when compared to those that have chosen other 
candidates. White, young men, with higher income, neopentecostal residents of the 
South or Midwest are neither more nor less satisfied with democracy than the other 
Brazilians.
Nevertheless, ideological self-identification distinguishes Bolsonaro’s voters from those 
supporting other candidates. While close to half (49%) of the bolsonaristas say they are 
on the right -- ranking higher than 7 on a scale of 1 to 10, where 1 is to be on the left -- only 
19% of voters of other candidates do the same as shown in Table 7.
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Table 7. Self-classification of respondents on a left - right scale 
among those who voted and did not vote for Bolsonaro 
(1 = left and 10 = right)
Left (1) - Right (10) placement
Others Bolsonaro
1 0.16 0.06
2 0.05 0.05
3 0.12 0.04
4 0.06 0.05
5 0.24 0.15
6 0.09 0.09
7 0.09 0.08
8 0.06 0.17
9 0.03 0.08
10 0.10 0.23
Total 1.00 1.00
Source: LAPOP 2019
Regardless of being bolsonarista or not, people with some features of the Bolsonaro’s 
core supporters tend to identify more with the right. White men with income ranging 
from three to four minimum wages, evangelical and non-evangelical protestants con-
sider themselves more to the right than people with other socioeconomic profiles, both 
among those who voted for Bolsonaro and those who did not. Tables with the results can 
be found in the Appendix 2.
Answers to questions such as whether the state should reduce inequality or spend more 
with the poorest and if rich people should pay more and receive less are very similar 
for bolsonaristas and other voters for all socioeconomic profiles with the exception, as 
expected, of those with higher income. In brief, being at the political right here seems to 
be more related to moral and behavioral issues..
In indeed, while 56% of Bolsonaro’s voters disapprove of same-sex marriage (with 36% 
strongly disapproving), 39% of other candidates’ supporters share the same opinion (Table 
8). Controlling by the vote in the first round, those who most disapproved of gay marriage 
are the poorest, neopentecostal evangelical, living in the North and Northeast regions.
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Table 8. Position regarding same sex marriage 
among those who voted and did not vote for Bolsonaro
Same-sex people should have the right to marry 
(1 = Frimly desapprove. 10 = Firmly approve)
Others Bolsonaro
1 0.23 0.36
2 0.06 0.04
3 0.03 0.04
4 0.02 0.03
5 0.05 0.09
6 0.04 0.04
7 0.07 0.04
8 0.06 0.04
9 0.06 0.07
10 0.39 0.25
Total 1.00 1.00
Source: LAPOP 2019
On the other hand, there are no significant differences between bolsonaristas and other 
voters regarding abortion, when the mother risks dying. Nearly 80% of respondents agree 
that mothers can have an abortion if childbirth poses a risk to their health (Table 9).
There are also no significant differences in the approval of government support for im-
migrants, even if Venezuelans (LAPOP has introduced some experiments to see the re-
action to immigration when it comes to Venezuelan). 65% of respondents are in favor of 
governmental aid to immigrants, regardless of their vote preference.
Table 9. Position regarding abortion in case of the risk of death of the 
mother among those who voted and did not vote for Bolsonaro
Abortion is justified 
in case of risk to mother health
Others Bolsonaro
Disagree 0.23 0.26
Agree 0.77 0.74
Total 1.00 1.00
Source: LAPOP 2019
If dissatisfaction with the economic situation made the European voters turn towards 
populism, the opposite seems to have happened here. Table 10 shows that when asked 
about the country’s situation in the last two months, 32% of bolsonaristas think it has 
improved against 15% of those who voted for other candidates.
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Table 10. Perception regarding country’s situation in the last twelve months 
among those who voted and did not vote for Bolsonaro
Economic situation of the country 
in the last 2 months
Others Bolsonaro
Better 0.15 0.32
Same 0.48 0.43
Worst 0.38 0.26
Total 1.00 1.00
Source: LAPOP 2019
Only 30% of respondents say they have any or too much interest in politics. 23% said they 
sympathized with a party, 45% of those with the PT, 7% with the PSDB, and the same 
proportion with the MDB. These numbers are in line with research on party identifica-
tion in Brazil. The surprise is that 20% of those who said to sympathize with any party 
has pointed out to the PSL, Bolsonaro’s party, until recently an unknown and insignifi-
cant political organization. 
Among those who voted for Bolsonaro, anti-PT attitudes are more robust, as expected. 
On a scale ranging from 1 to 10 -where 1 means does not like the party at all- the average 
PT score is 4 for the whole sample. Among the bolsonaristas, the score drops to 2,4. In 
comparison, the PSDB’s average score was 3,6 and MDB’s was 3,3.
Preliminary 
conclusions
In brief, Bolsonaro seems to have conquered a niche of conservative supporters regar-
ding moral values, mobilizing people that identify themselves with the political right, 
support law and order policies, are critical to the PT but are not anti-systemic or spe-
cially disaffected towards democracy. Voters that, under different circumstances, could 
have chosen other conservative candidates not necessarily from the extreme-right.
In October 2018, the newspaper Folha de S.Paulo, using survey data from Datafolha, 
arrived at a similar conclusion: 
Despite having chosen Jair Bolsonaro (PSL) as president on Sunday (28), the Brazilian po-
pulation is opposed to the retired Army captain on central issues of his governmental pro-
posals or his rhetoric: freedom for arms possession by civilians; criticism of homosexuals; 
and the defense of the military dictatorship. (Seto, 2018)
How to reconcile those findings with the image of a polarized political scenario? How 
can we explain that supporters of the current extreme-right populist president value 
democracy, trust institutions and identify themselves with parties as much as other vo-
ters? How can we understand that such voters have chosen a president that routinely 
displays anti-democratic behavior and rhetorics and jeopardizes fundamental rights?
We think that the literature on populism or on the rise of the extreme right in Europe 
helps us little.
Conventional wisdom has pointed out to the importance of anti-system feelings, to the 
emotional rejection of politicians and parties leading to the choice of the candidate that 
presented himself as an outsider.
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On the other hand, in the academic field, there are some alternative theories. One is 
antipetism (Samuels & Zucco, 2018): people voted against the party that ruled Brazil 
during 14 years. Another one rests on the literature on voting behavior and may give 
us some interesting hints. Both the directional theory of voting (Rabonowitz & Macdo-
nald, 1989) and the discount theory (Grofman, 1985; Adam, Merril and Grofman, 2001; 
Tomz and Van Howeling, 2008) argue that, under certain circumstances, it is rational 
for relatively moderate voters to support more radical candidates. In presidential regi-
mes, in times of great conflict between the executive and the legislature, or when exo-
genous restrictions, such as economic crises or pressure from external agents, limit the 
government’s range of maneuver, voters discount the Executive’s ability to implement 
its proposals. Therefore, they will accept a radical agenda aware that it is probably un-
feasible. Empirical evidence shows that this occurred in France in 1988 and Norway in 
1989 (Adam, Merril, Grofman, 2001) and, more recently, experiments confirmed that 
moderate or poorly politicized voters tend to discount the candidate’s radical promises 
(Tomz & Van Howeling, 2008) .
In Brazil, between the mid-1990’s and the mid-2010’s, the executive and legislative coo-
perated to solve what was then seen as the country’s most pressing problems: inflation 
and poverty. Therefore, the voters behaved according to the Downsian model, choosing 
the proposals closest to their ideal point. After the 2013 events, political polarization 
has increased, cooperation between the executive and the legislature deteriorated, and 
there has been little progress in solving problems that came to be considered severe, 
such as unemployment and corruption. The average voter may have started to discount 
candidates’ ability to implement solutions and support more extreme proposals. In Bol-
sonaro’s election, many of his voters could have put his most extreme statements into 
perspective.
In this article we cannot test the hypothesis suggested by those theories. However, we 
can ask ourselves about the consequences of this type of electoral behavior in compari-
son to the theory of populism. Only time will tell which of these models better explain 
what has happened.
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Anexo 1 Vote for Bolsonaro 
according to sociodemographic and economic characteristics
Vote for Bolosnaro
Age 0.013 (0.016)
Sex (Woman) -0.668 (0.448)
Income 2 a 3 SM 0.309 (0.662)
Income 3 a 4 SM 0.189 (0.901)
Income 4 a 5 SM -0.114 (0.851)
Income > 5 SM 0.227 (0.948)
Indigenous -1.057 (2.025)
Black -0.511 (0.664)
Brown -0.459 (0.564)
Other 0.201 (2.162)
Yellow -0.709 (1.073)
Northeast -0.934 (0.894)
Middle-West -0.075 (1.112)
Southeast -0.089 (0.858)
South 0.085 (1.032)
Protestant, Traditional Protestant 
or Non-Evangelical Protestant 0.469 (0.741)
Non-Christian Eastern Religions 1.039 (4.089)
None (Believe in a Higher Self 
but do not belong to any religion) -0.393 (0.755)
Evangelical and Pentecostal 1.025* (0.617)
Traditional Religions -0.929 (1.735)
Agnostic or atheist 
(does not believe in God) 0.447 (1.628)
Other -0.309 (1.757)
Kardecist Spiritist -0.590 (1.393)
Prty Id 0.022 (0.513)
Constant 0.338 (1.206) 
Observations 945
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
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Anexo 2 Ideological self-positioning 
according to socioeconomic characteristics and vote
Position on the left-right scale
Age 0.013 (0.020)
Woman -0.529 (0.554)
Income 2 a 3 SM 0.451 (0.810)
Income 3 a 4 SM 0.722 (1.086)
Income 4 a 5 SM 0.656 (1.083)
Income > 5 SM 0.733 (1.132)
Indigenous 0.556 (2.582)
Black -0.599 (0.822)
Brown -0.305 (0.700)
Other 0.184 (2.574)
Yellow -0.669 (1.351)
Northeast -0.240 (1.121)
Middle-West 0.037 (1.396)
Southeast 0.0001 (1.072)
South -0.532 (1.270)
Protestant, Traditional Protestant 
or Non-Evangelical Protestant
0.453 (0.948)
Non-Christian Eastern Religions 2.043 (5.232)
None (Believe in a Higher Self 
but do not belong to any religion)
-0.138 (0.941)
Evangelical and Pentecostal 0.461 (0.728)
Traditional Religions -0.061 (2.029)
Agnostic or atheist 
(does not believe in God)
0.496 (1.967)
Other 1.423 (2.182)
Kardecist Spiritist 0.816 (1.847)
Vote for Bolsonaro 1.491** (0.582)
Constant 4.891*** (1.552)
Observations 894
Log Likelihood -2,180.597 
Akaike Inf. Crit. 4,411.194
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
     
